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Abstract:
We provide evidence that the presence of bankers in the board of directors reduce infor-
mation asymmetry between credit markets and firms. We show that the impact of the
presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low level of debt. This effect is am-
plified the more connected the bankers are to the corporate world. Additionally the results
are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness
of bankers play a key role in reducing information asymmetry.
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1 Introduction
There is evidence that bankers in the board of firms impact positively the capacity to
increase their debt level (e.g. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) and Ferreira and Matos
(2012)). In this paper we provide evidence that this leverage impact is essentially driven by
low debt firms. We also suggest that the role of bankers as debt facilitators can be better
understood by exploring their connectedness. In fact we provide further evidence that the
impact of bankers is amplified the more connected they are to the corporate world, and also
that this amplification effect is larger for firms with low level of debt. Finally we show that
these results are stronger for less transparent firms, which is consistent with the idea that
connected bankers reduce information asymmetry.
Using a sample of non-financial U.S firms (S&P 1500 constituents), we find that the
presence of a banker increases the leverage ratio by 22,6%. The positive average treatment
effect is consistent with previous literature results.
We then test if the connectedness of bankers impact on the debt level. We measure the
connectedness of each of the board members using board membership data. In contrast
with the board interlocks literature, this approach allows to distinguishing the connected-
ness of dierent directors, thus identifying the role of individual bankers in the information
transmission mechanism. Our results indicate that the impact of bankers connectedness on
the debt level is also positive, on average, and robust to different measures of connectedness
commonly used in the social networks literature.
Additionally we build an information asymmetry index for each firm, following Gomes
and Phillips (2012), and check how the previous result differs across various levels of trans-
parency. Our findings indicate that the impact of bankers connectedness on the debt level
is reduced when information asymmetry problems are less severe. These results are con-
sistent with the interpretation that connected bankers contribute more to the reduction of
information asymmetry and that this contribution is more important for opaque firms.
Finally, we use quantile regressions to distinguish both effects (presence and connect-
edness of bankers) for firms with different levels of leverage. We show that, for firms with
relatively low levels of debt, both the presence and the connectedness of bankers will im-
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pact positively on the debt level. These effects are not present when analyzing firms with
relatively high levels of debt. Our interpretation is that bankers contribute to the reduction
of information asymmetry, transmitting to the market their perception of the debt capacity
use. Again, these results are robust to the different measures of connectedness used.
We classify two individuals as connected if they sit on a given board in the same year.
By construction the number of directors in each board will automatically impact the con-
nectedness measures. Also, the larger the board, the more likely it is to find a banker in
the board. We thus address the endogeneity concerns using board size as an instrument,
since board size per se does not affect the debt level of a rm.
An extensive literature1 provides evidence that the presence of bankers in companies
boards impacts positively the capacity of these firms to increase their debt level. Among
others, Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) and Ferreira and Matos (2012) argue that the
effect of bankers’ presence in the board of borrower firms is the development of a special
lending relationship that facilitates the access to the credit market.
The relations between banks and corporations are known to reduce informational asym-
metries and thus lowering the financing costs Diamond (1984). In particular banker-
directors (bankers who sit simultaneously on the board of directors of a bank and of non-
financial firms) provide financial expertise (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and Maciver, 1989) and
monitor effectively the management of firms, lowering the costs of funds (James, 1987;
Williamson, 1988; Berger and Udell, 1995; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Booth and Deli
(1999), Kroszner and Strahan (2001), and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) show a positive cor-
relation between firms’ capital structure and the presence of unaffiliated banker-directors
(who do not have direct conflict of interest in the capital structure’s decision). Krakaw and
Zenner (1998) show evidence of negative price reaction to announcement of loan renewals
involving a bank represented on the firm’s board, reflecting the fact that creditors on the
board have an informational advantage over outside creditors. Using an international sam-
ple of firms with bankers on board, Ferreira and Matos (2012) provide evidence that banks
extract informational rents from the firms, by charging higher loan rates in favorable market
1See Petersen and Rajan (1994),Berger and Udell (1995), Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), Ciamarra (2006),
Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012), and Ferreira and Matos (2012).
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conditions. Gu¨ner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) also shows that the presence of financial
experts on the board affect corporate decisions, although not always in the best interest of
shareholders.
The role of networks connecting board members has been exploited in many different
corporate finance contexts (e.g. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and
So, 2009; Bouwman and Xuan, 2010; Bouwman, 2011; Stuart and Yim, 2010; Fracassi, 2012;
Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013). Regarding the relation of firms with credit markets, Chuluun,
Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) provides evidence that, on average, the connectedness
of the firm (as measured by board interlocks) is negatively related with the cost of debt and
that this effect is stronger in the presence of higher information asymmetry. By assuming
that networks facilitate the information dissemination mechanism as argued by Chuluun,
Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014), following Nohria (1992), Burt (1997), and Nahapiet
and Ghoshal (1998), using board interlocks instead of individual connections will not allow
for understanding the role of individual bankers in the process.
Our work contributes to this discussion by building on two critical aspects. First, the
connectedness measures in our paper are based on the connectedness of each of the members
of the board, allowing to identifying the role of individuals in the information transmission
mechanism. Our technology allows us to further refine the results of Chuluun, Prevost,
and Puthenpurackal (2014) by focusing on the role of specific bankers who sit on the board
of firms, linking to the spirit of Byrd and Mizruchi (2005),Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons
(2012), and Ferreira and Matos (2012). Additionally, we are able to show that their reported
impact of board connectedness in the leverage of firms is mostly driven by banker-directors’
connectedness.
Second, and most importantly, we distinguish the average positive impact of bankers in
debt level for firms with different levels of leverage. We provide robust evidence that this is
true for firms with relatively low levels of debt but it is not true for over-levered firms. We
further provide evidence to corroborate the interpretation that bankers sitting in the board
of firms help reducing information asymmetries in the credit market.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we hypothesize how the presence (and
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the centrality) of a banker-director may affect the capital structure decisions. In Section
3 we describe the methodology and the data, addressing firstly, the directors’ network
and the centrality measures used to classify the influential role of bankers and secondly,
the estimation procedures used to correct for a possible endogeneity bias, and finally we
describe our databases. In Section 4 we present the results. The main conclusions are
summarized in Section 5.
2 The role of bankers
Podolny (1994) points that social relationships between market agents may prevent market
failure due to uncertainty and information asymmetry. Additionally, networks of social
relationships can be shown to allow information gathering from non-directly connected
sources, playing a crucial role in screening and selecting the relevant pieces of information
(Burt, 1997), and lowering information-gathering costs (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
In the same way, we should expect the social relationships of the directors of a firm
to play a role in information transmission, reducing the information asymmetry between
agents in the market. Shane and Cable (2002) show the importance of social ties in obtaining
venture capital.
Our proposal is to use the network of the boards and directors as a proxy for the real
social network of market agents. This means that the network we construct only has partial
information of the professional relationships between agents, excluding all other relation-
ships, both professional (all non-board related connections) or private (family/friendship
ties or common memberships of Universities, clubs). Also, we can only observe that two
directors sit in the same board at a particular time and assume that those two must know
each other and are, therefore, directly connected.
Using social network analysis and suitable centrality measures, we infer the influence
of each director. In particular, we are interested in the role of bankers-directors in the
information flow, and its impact on the reduction of information asymmetries and, as a
consequence, its impact on the firm’s access to the credit market. If the social network of
directors is a good proxy for the real life social network, we should then expect that the
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presence of a banker on the board of firm may reduce the information asymmetry between
firm and lenders which, in turn, allows the firm to increase its leverage. Specifically, we test
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 On average, the presence of a banker on the board increases the leverage of
a firm.
Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) have already tested for hypothesis 1, i.e. they tested for the
mere presence of bankers in boards. However, no study has evaluated the role of banker-
directors in the information transmission mechanism. If it is true that bankers are important
in reducing information asymmetry, then the more connected a banker is, the more effective
she will be in that role. Note that we do not assume that the banker is sharing insider
information or acting in any other illegal way. It suffices to interpret the banker’s role in
the information transmission mechanism as in Burt (1997), where the network is used as a
filter for the relevant pieces of information: when the market analyses all pieces of available
information, it will give more weight to information coming from more influential sources
than others. Again, assuming that a reduction in the information asymmetry facilitates the
access to the credit markets, we test for the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 On average, the more connected a banker-director, the higher the leverage
of a firm.
Other factors than connected bankers can contribute to disseminate information and
hence, the level of information asymmetry (or opacity) does not depend only on the pres-
ence of bankers. Bankers may be invited to sit on boards of more or less opaque firms. Our
assumption is that the higher the information asymmetry, the more important is the role of
a connected banker for the information transmission mechanism. This same idea is corrob-
orated in the financial literature in different contexts (e.g. Butler, 2007; Mansi, Maxwell,
and Miller, 2010; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012; Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpu-
rackal, 2014). If the effect of the presence of a banker-director on the firm’s level of debt is
in fact due to a reduction in the information asymmetry, then one should expect this effect
to be higher the more opaque the firm and the more connected the banker-director. We
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specify this hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 3 The higher the level of information asymmetry, the larger the average im-
pact of the connectedness of a banker on the leverage of a firm.
It is also natural to assume that the way bankers reduce information asymmetry will
strongly differ according to the debt level of firms. A banker sitting in the board of a firm
with a relatively low level of debt, will perceive the probability that such firm is below
its optimal debt capacity as very high. In that case, the bankers’ role is to facilitate the
dissemination of that message to the market, favouring both the firm and potential lenders.
On the contrary, if a banker is sitting in the board of a firm with a relatively high level
of debt, the probability of bankruptcy may be perceived as too high and the banker’s role
should be to discourage further debt. We thus formalize our hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 4 For firms with relatively low levels of debt, bankers facilitate the increase of
leverage level, whereas for high-levered firms this is not true.
Finally we combine the assumptions in Hypothesis 2 and 4 into a different observable
assumption. Hypothesis 2 states that the more connected a banker-director is, the larger is
her impact on the debt level of a firm. Hypothesis 4 says that the likelihood of debt increase
is larger the lower the initial value of debt. Thus, we assume that the effect described in
the latter must be amplified by the banker’s level of connectedness. Our final hypothesis
reads:
Hypothesis 5 For firms with relatively low (high) levels of debt, the more connected the
bankers are, the larger is their capacity to facilitate (impede) debt increase.
3 Network Construction and Centrality Measures
Information does not flow between firms, but rather through the individuals placed in
different firms. Therefore, we opt to construct the network of relationships between directors
instead of pure board interlocks, as exemplified below. In Figure 1, there are three firms
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and eight directors. Note that there are no connections between directors. Directors are
linked only to firms where they sit on the board2.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 2 is the result projecting the network in Figure 1 onto the space of directors.
Each individual is linked to all others with whom he shares a board. However, a usual
approach in the literature is to consider only the board interlocks. This dilutes the network
characteristics relevant to information transmission. In the example above, the complex
network of Figure 2 would be reduced to a simple network where firms A and C are connected
to firm B.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Instead, using the network of directors, we are able to measure the role of each individual
on the flow of information, by computing a connectedness measure for each individual on the
network. We focus on three basic measures of connectedness commonly used in information
flows /contagion analysis: degree, closeness and betweenness. These measures are also
referred as centrality measures.
The degree of a vertex is the number of connections of a vertex with other vertices of the
network. Within the directors’ network it represents the number of directors with whom
a particular individual is related to. A director with higher degree centrality knows more
directors inside the network.
Closeness centrality (Sabidussi, 1966) is the inverse of the average distance from a par-
ticular vertex to every other vertex. Within the directors’ network, it represents the average
number of contacts that a director would have to make in order to reach any other direc-
tor on the network3. A director with higher closeness centrality will need on average less
intermediaries to reach any other director.
2This is a characteristic of affiliation networks, more generally referred to as 2-mode network. These
networks have two types of vertices and connections can only occur between vertices of different types.
3As there are directors which are isolated/separated from part of the network, the classical definition of
closeness is not well defined. The solution for these cases, is to use the influential range of each director, i.e.
to measure the centrality within the reachable component of the network (Lin, 1976) as a ratio of the total
number of vertices
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Betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977) may be interpreted as the probability that di-
rector i is a vehicle of information transfer between director k and director j, assuming that
all shortest paths are equally likely to be used.
After computing the connectedness measures for each individual in the directors’ net-
work, we aggregate the latter at the firm level. As we are interested in the information role
of bankers-directors, we only use the connectedness of banker-directors in the aggregation
process: for each firm, the corresponding connectedness measure is the maximum value of
the banker-director in the board. If there is no banker-director, the centrality measure is 0.
We proxy the informational role of the board through the maximum for two reasons. First,
we assume that the determinant individual in the information distribution is the one who
is more connected/influential. Second, the sum of centrality measures can be ambiguously
interpreted. Figure 3 five demonstrates this procedure using the previous three firms exam-
ple. Firm C now plays the role of a bank and, hence, Director 5 is a banker-director. Each
director’s centrality degree is shown in parentheses. The three directors of Firm 1 have
degrees of 2, 2 and 4. However the degree centrality of Firm 1 will be 0 as it has no banker
seating on the board. Firm 2 has a one banker on the board with degree 4. Therefore the
degree centrality of Firm 2 will be 4. Had the Firm had a second banker on the board with
connections to less than 4 other directors, the degree of Firm 2 would had still be 4.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
4 Data
Our network data is based on the Directors database provided by ISS (former RiskMetrics).
The sample includes board information for S&P1500 firms from 1996 to 2013 with data on
more than 11000 directors/year. We consider that two directors are connected in a particular
year if they sit in the same board during that year4 and compute the connectedness measures
mentioned above for each individual/year.
Remaining variables are compiled using Compustat/CRSP. Our variable of debt level
4We only consider contemporaneous connections, although it can be argued that the social network is
built throughout the years, accumulating connections.
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is the leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total interest bearing debt to the sum itself
with market capitalization [Compustat items: (dltt+dlc) / (dltt+dlc+(prcc f*csho))]. We
also include the usual controls5: EBIT [Compustat item: ib+xint+txt ] over total assets
[Compustat item: at ] as the profitability measure; the log of market-to-book ratio as growth
opportunities measure [Compustat items: ln((dltt+dlc+pstkl+prcc f*csho)/at)]; the ratio of
depreciation expenses [Compustat item: dp] to total assets, controlling for firms with less
need for debt related tax shield; the logarithm of total assets as a measure of size; the ratio
of fixed [Compustat item: ppegt ] to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility; the ratio
of R&D expenditure [Compustat item: xrd ] to total assets as a proxy for asset specificity
6; and the standard deviation of abnormal returns as a proxy for firm volatility. We also
control for industry median and year fixed effects.
After merging the two databases, our sample includes 15426 firm-year observations. The
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Banker-directors are present in 26.7% of the
firms.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
We build a proxy of firm opacity based on the method proposed by Gomes and Phillips
(2012) (henceforth IAmm) which consists in averaging quintile rankings of individual in-
formation asymmetry proxies. As is Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), we include analysts
forecast errors and dispersion of analyst opinions from I\B\E\S, volatility of residual re-
turns and firm age from CRSP7. Following the suggestion of Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu
(2009), we also rank the quintiles of the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, the Amivest
illiquidity ratio (Kerry Cooper, Groth, and Avera, 1985; Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauter-
bach, 1997), the fraction of proportional quoted and Rolls (1984) effective spread due to
adverse selection for each stock. After merging with our sample, we have 12005 firm-year
observations. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
5For a thorough review of the literature, see Frank and Goyal (2008)
6For firms not reporting R&D expenses, this ratio is set to zero. We add a dummy variable to identify
these cases
7We do not compute the volatility of abnormal returns around earnings announcements
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We use board size as an instrument, where board size is the total number of directors
on each board, measured by the number of directors listed in Riskmetrics. The larger the
number of directors on the board, the higher the probability that one of the directors also sits
at a bank. We do not expect the board size itself to impact directly on debt levels ratio of the
firm, however there is a positive relationship between firm size and board size documented
in the literature. Both Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) and Boone, Field, Karpoff, and
Raheja (2007) find evidence that the board size of firms increase with size and complexity
of operations, where the former study focuses on young firms (< 10 years since IPO) and
the latter on the different characteristics of boards in small and large firms. This positive
relationship between firm and board size is also present in our data. Nevertheless, when
using the centrality measures under the IV approach, board size seems a good candidate for
instrument as the centrality measures of the directors are, by construction, dependent of
the original board size 8. Therefore, larger boards will automatically increase the number
of connections between the directors seating on those boards, independently of any boards
interlocks.
5 Results
This section presents our results for the testing of the main hypothesis.
As for H1 and H2, the market debt ratio (MDR) of a firm, as defined in the former
section, should be directly related to the presence and the connectedness of the banker-
director. We thus generate a variable Bankeri,t that in the case of H1 is associated to
the presence of a banker-director, and in the case of H2 is associated to her degree of
connectedness. In that sense the regression reads
MDRi,t+1 = δBankeri,t + βControlsi,t + i,t, (1)
where the dependent variable is the market leverage ratio, as defined in the previous section,
Banker may denote either the presence of banker on the board (hypothesis 1)or one of
8We construct the network of directors, by projecting the original (2-mode) network, with boards and
directors, onto a network of only directors, where directors are connected if they share the same board in
the same year
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the three banker-director connectedness measures (hypothesis 2), and Controls include all
control variables including year fixed effects, also defined in the previous section. The latter
are winsorized at 1% level. The  term may include firm fixed effects.
We need to correct for possible endogeneity bias when testing for our hypothesis that
bankers-directors (and their centrality on the network) affect the debt level of a firm. The
choice of board composition, and hence the presence and connectedness of the banker,
may not be independent of the choice of the debt level. We use average treatment effects
regression to estimate the average impact of the presence of a banker-director on debt level
(hypothesis 1) and I.V. regressions to correct for possible endogeneity biases (hypothesis 2)
9.
In order to test hypothesis 3, we add an extra term, interacting the presence and the
connectedness of the banker-directors with the Information Asymmetry index presented in
the former section:
MDRi,t+1 = δBankeri,t + γ0IAmmi,t + γ1Bankeri,t × IAmmi,t + βControlsi,t + i,t. (2)
Hypothesis 4 and 5 require a quantile regression approach (Koenker and Basset, 1978;
Koenker and Machado, 1999). We use the method proposed by Cattaneo (2010) which
allows estimating treatment effects on different quantiles, dealing simultaneously with en-
dogeneity and multi-dosage treatments.
5.1 Average Effect of the presence of Banker-Directors
We test hypothesis 1 by running the regression on (1) Table 3 presents the results for testing
the average impact of the presence of banker-directors on the debt levels of firms.
The first column presents the results of the OLS regressions; the second column is a panel
regression including firm fixed effects; the third column reports the result incorporating the
average treatment effect that takes into account the endogeneity problem. As expected, this
latter result retrieves what was found in Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Ciamarra (2006):
the presence of banker-directors on boards increases, on average, the debt level of firms.
9Using I.V. with binary endogenous may lead to biases estimates of the parameters of interest (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996)
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Notice that although in the OLS and the panel regression the sign of the average impact of
a banker-director is negative, when the endogeneity is taken into account the sign reverts
and becomes positive and significant.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
5.2 Average Effect of the connectedness of Banker-Directors
We test hypothesis 2 by running again the regression on equation (1), but now using the
variable Banker as different measures of connectedness of the bankers sitting on the board.
Table 4 presents the results for testing the average impact of banker-directors’ connectedness
on the debt levels of firms.
The first three columns present the results of the I.V. regressions on the connectedness
measures, with year fixed effects, whereas the last three columns also incorporate firm fixed
effects. As easily observed, in both cases the three measures of connectedness (Degree,
Closeness and Betweenness) are positive and statistically significant.
In a similar vein of Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2010) who find that the
board connectedness impact negatively, on average, the cost of debt, our results indicate
that connectedness of banker-directors impacts positively, on average, the debt level. As a
robustness test of our results we compute the connectedness of boards excluding bankers
and notice in table 5 that its impact on debt level is statistically insignificant10. In this
sense our results suggest that the findings in Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2010)
are driven by the presence of bankers in the boards. Given the highly skewed distribution
of connectedness, it is not enough to consider the mere presence of banker-director on the
board. We show that on average, the higher the banker’s connectedness, the stronger is
his/her impact on the debt level of the firm., ceteris paribus.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
These effects are also economically significant. If we only consider the data with year
10This result holds for all connectedness measures except degree. The reason why this variable is less
interesting for this purpose is that while it captures only direct connections for the individuals, both variables
closeness and betweenness integrate connectedness information from the whole network. Thus, these last
variables better capture the information flow within the network.
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effects and no fixed effects an increase of one standard deviation in any of the connectedness
measures (i.e., degree, closeness or betweenness) is associated with an increase of 8.13, 9.72
and 11.13 percentage points of the market debt ratio, respectively. By including fixed
effects, these numbers change into 6.65, 9.19 and 7.64.
As explained previously, we use board size as instrument in all regressions. Unreported
first stage results confirm the positive relation between board size and connectedness of
banker-directors. In addition, the coefficients of the control variables are significant and
have the expected sign.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
5.3 Information asymmetry and Banker-Directors
Our basic interpretation is that the presence of bankers in the board facilitates the com-
munication with the market, and the more connected the banker is, the more effective that
communication is in reducing information asymmetry. We thus assume that the impact
of bankers in defining the debt level is larger for firms facing higher levels of information
asymmetry, as in Hypothesis 3. We test that hypothesis by considering the interaction
of an aggregate index of information asymmetry proxies (as in Bharath, Pasquariello, and
Wu, 2009; Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011; Gomes and Phillips, 2012) with (i) the presence
of bankers in the board and (ii) several different measures of connectedness of these bankers.
From Table 6 we can see that the interaction with both the presence of bankers and
with the different connectedness measures of these bankers are positive and significant, thus
corroborating the hypothesis as stated.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
5.4 Quantile regressions and bankers’ presence
We assume that a banker-director in a firm with a relatively low level of debt will perceive
the probability of bankruptcy as very low. Alternatively, if the level of debt is relatively
high, the probability of bankruptcy is perceived as high. Thus, the way bankers use their
channels of communication to the market in order to reduce information asymmetry will
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differ according to the debt level of firms. For low debt levels the presence of bankers on
the board will facilitate the increase of debt, whereas for high debt level the presence of
bankers will make it harder to increase the debt level. This is the content of Hypothesis 4.
In order to test this hypothesis, we use quantile regressions, as it allows us to focus on
effects on a specific quantile - where low (high) quantiles represent relatively low (high)
debt level firms - instead of on the average effect provided by the previous estimations. In
particular, we compute the quantile treatment effects (Firpo, 2007; Cattaneo, 2010) taking
into account the same endogeneity issue referred to in the previous sections. The results
in Table7 represent the average treatment effect of the presence of a Banker per quantile.
As we can see, for low quantiles including the median(i.e., firms with low level of debt) the
effect is positive and statistically significant at 90% level. For higher quantiles, although
this effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero, the impact is negative suggesting
that the presence of bankers in the board tends to reduce firms’ debt level.
These results are coherent with those presented in Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), who split
their sample into high- and low-distressed firms, analysing for each subgroup its average
behaviour. Although their results pointed to a similar interpretation, our quantile approach
allows to analyse the different impact throughout the whole distribution of debt level.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
5.5 Quantile regressions and bankers’ connectedness
Following the argument raised before, we assume that more connected banker-directors
can be more effective in the dissemination of information, simply because they have more
channels of information available to pass their message to the markets. In that sense, we
would expect that the connectedness of bankers will amplify the effect described before.
This what has been expressed as Hypothesis 5.
In order to test this hypothesis, we again run a quantile regression to measure the
separate impact of highly connected bankers from that of not so well connected bankers.
We do so by estimating a multi-treatment effect quantile regression with two levels of
treatment. We split the bankers in two groups: group 1 composed of weakly connected
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bankers (with respect to the median degree) and group 2 composed of highly connected
bankers. The results are shown in Table 8, indicating that for low levered firms the impact
of well connected bankers is approximately twice as much as for low connected bankers.
In the lowest quantile the presence of a highly connected banker increases debt by 1.5%,
whereas the presence of a low connected banker increases debt by only 0.6%. In the next
quantile the ratio is 1.7% to 0.9%. In the median the ratio goes to 1.0% to 0.5% but these
numbers are no longer statistically significant, as it is the case for higher quantiles (i.e. for
firms with relatively higher levels of debt). Interestingly, although not significant, almost
all the numbers for higher quantiles are negative, suggesting that the presence of highly
connected bankers in the board tends to reduce firms’ debt level11.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
11We repeated the analysis for the different measures of connectedness and the results are qualitatively
equivalent.
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6 Conclusion
There are two different classes of well-known results regarding the role of boards in the debt
capacity of firms. The first result is that the presence of bankers help firms increasing debt.
The second is that the leverage effect is more effective the more connected boards are. We
contribute for the first result by showing that the presence of bankers has more impact the
more connected they are. We contribute for the second result by showing that the impact
of boards’ connectedness is driven by the bankers’ connectedness. Finally, we show that
both effect are only relevant for firms with relatively low debt level.
Our findings suggest that firms can use connected bankers on the board in order to
reduce information asymmetry. The presence of connected bankers is shown to increase
on average the debt level of the US firms included in our sample. After correcting for
endogeneity and controlling for other firms’ characteristics, this effect is shown to be sta-
tistically significant. Moreover, this result is stronger the larger the connectedness of the
banker on the directorship network. Our results seem to be robust with respect to the
various measures of connectedness used throughout the paper.
In particular, the last part of these results suggests that bankers-directors have an essen-
tial role in the market dissemination of information. The more connected a banker is on the
network, the more channels of communication she can use to transmit information, reducing
information asymmetries between the firm and the credit market and consequently, allow-
ing for higher levels of debt. This effect on the debt level is reduced for less opaque firms,
sustaining our interpretation of the role of banker-directors as an information asymmetry
reduction mechanism.
We provide evidence that both the presence and the connectedness of bankers increase
the debt of low-leverage firms, while decrease the debt of high-leverage firms. These effects
are shown to be statistically significant for the former but not for the latter. Once again,
this justifies the mechanism of information asymmetry reduction described above.
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A Tables
count mean sd min max
MDRplus1 15426 0.2073 0.1974 0.0000 1.0000
EBIT/Assets 15426 0.0899 0.1114 -0.4305 0.3691
log Market-to-Book 15426 0.3357 0.5815 -0.8672 2.0415
Depreciation/Assets 15426 0.0446 0.0260 0.0063 0.1620
log Assets 15426 21.2317 1.4912 18.1884 25.2040
Tangibles Assets 15426 0.2834 0.2167 0.0135 0.8872
R&D expenses 15426 0.0300 0.0497 0.0000 0.2531
R&D not declared 15426 0.3495 0.4768 0.0000 1.0000
St Dev Returns 15426 0.0266 0.1110 0.0000 0.8378
Industry Median 15426 0.1659 0.1206 0.0000 0.6948
Presence 15426 0.2671 0.4424 0.0000 1.0000
Board Size 15426 5.9654 1.2923 1.0000 15.0000
Degree 15426 9.6262 18.3179 0.0000 165.0000
Closeness 15426 0.0480 0.0812 0.0000 0.2468
Betweenness 15426 0.0009 0.0021 0.0000 0.0285
IAmm 12005 2.7758 0.4608 1.5000 4.6000
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Main variables
count mean sd min max
Inf. Asym. 12005 2.7758 0.4608 1.5000 4.6000
Forecast Error 12005 220.3316 1026.2388 0.0000 5000.0000
Dispersion of Opinion 12005 5.2906 24.6292 0.0000 120.0000
Abn. Ret. Volatility 12005 0.0237 0.0118 0.0053 0.2305
Firm’s Age 12005 25.9603 19.6885 0.0000 87.0000
Bid-ask Spread 12005 0.2478 4.3880 0.0100 330.0000
Effective Spread 12005 0.4766 0.4117 -4.7518 1.0000
Information Driven Volume 12005 0.4588 0.3999 -1.8368 2.0649
Proportional Spread 12005 0.9961 0.1242 -0.9217 6.6504
Amihud 12005 0.0004 0.0064 -0.4050 0.2938
Amivest 12005 665743.1296 11956781.8291 4.1017 8.4887e+08
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Information Asymmetry Index and proxies used.
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(1) (2) (3)
main
EBIT/Assets -0.277∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗
(-15.32) (-8.82) (-14.11)
log Market-to-Book -0.122∗∗∗ -0.0806∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-41.22) (-16.44) (-41.18)
Depreciation/Assets -0.432∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(-6.34) (-2.52) (-6.99)
log Assets 0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
(21.10) (5.88) (20.55)
Tangibles Assets 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0777∗∗ 0.0868∗∗∗
(10.06) (2.24) (10.46)
R&D expenses -0.261∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(-8.00) (-2.30) (-7.36)
R&D not declared 0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0100 0.0197∗∗∗
(6.71) (-0.82) (6.44)
St Dev Returns 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0502∗ 0.0309∗∗
(2.65) (1.86) (2.08)
Industry Median 0.253∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(17.51) (4.60) (17.46)
Presence -0.00629∗∗ -0.00253 0.226∗∗∗
(-2.16) (-0.57) (38.40)
Constant -0.108∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(-5.03) (-4.22) (-13.02)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. No No Yes
Observations 15426 15426 15426
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3: Presence of banker-director. We test hypothesis 1 by running the following regression
on equation 1 where the dependent variable, MDRt+1 is the debt level, measured as the ratio of total debt to
the sum of market capitalization and total debt, is regressed on (EBIT/TA) EBIT over total assets; the log
of market-to-book ratio; (Depreciation/Asssets) the log of total assets as a measure of size; Tangible Assets
is the ratio of fixed to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility; the ratio of R&D expenditure to total
assets as a proxy for asset specificity (missing R&D data is set to zero); and the standard deviation of total
returns index as proxy for firm volatility. We also control for year and industry median effects. Presence
denotes the presence of a banker-director on the Board. The first two columns are estimated with OLS,
while the third presents the average treatment effects estimates, where Board Size is used as instrument.
All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EBIT/Assets -0.295∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(-13.68) (-12.72) (-12.87) (-9.78) (-9.30) (-9.46)
log Market-to-Book -0.123∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0815∗∗∗ -0.0865∗∗∗
(-36.85) (-35.83) (-34.12) (-21.91) (-17.96) (-20.96)
Depreciation/Assets -0.544∗∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗
(-5.78) (-5.70) (-5.07) (-3.76) (-3.61) (-3.75)
log Assets 0.0000313 -0.00367 -0.00274 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗
(0.00) (-0.30) (-0.23) (3.75) (3.27) (6.13)
Tangibles Assets 0.0999∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0987∗∗∗
(8.42) (7.94) (6.99) (3.59) (2.87) (3.89)
R&D expenses -0.212∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗
(-5.00) (-4.09) (-5.62) (-3.30) (-3.00) (-3.12)
R&D not declared 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗ -0.0166∗ -0.0246∗∗
(6.09) (5.23) (5.85) (-2.06) (-1.82) (-2.03)
St Dev Returns 0.0158 0.0124 0.0137 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗
(0.75) (0.54) (0.59) (2.73) (2.61) (2.37)
Industry Median 0.217∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(8.84) (7.86) (7.16)
Degree 0.00444∗ 0.00363∗
(1.90) (1.76)
Closeness 1.197∗ 1.132∗
(1.83) (1.66)
Betweenness 53.01∗ 36.40∗
(1.77) (1.65)
Constant 0.170 0.236 0.224
(0.82) (0.94) (0.89)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15426 15426 15426 15229 15229 15229
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 4: Connectedness of banker-directors. We test hypothesis 2 by running the following
regression on equation 1 where the dependent variable, MDRt+1 is the debt level, measured as the ratio
of total debt to the sum of market capitalization and total debt, is regressed on (EBIT/TA) EBIT over
total assets; the log of market-to-book ratio; (Depreciation/Asssets) the log of total assets as a measure
of size; Tangible Assets is the ratio of fixed to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility; the ratio of
R&D expenditure to total assets as a proxy for asset specificity (missing R&D data is set to zero); , and the
standard deviation of total returns index as proxy for firm volatility. Degree, Closeness and Betweenness
denote the respective connectedness measures of a banker-director on the Board. All estimates include Board
Size as instrument and year fixed effects. The last three columns add firm fixed effects. We also control for
year-industry median effects. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3)
Degree 0.00363∗ 0.00419∗ 0.0140∗
(1.76) (1.79) (1.70)
Closeness 1.132∗ 2.585 5.300
(1.66) (1.45) (1.17)
Betweenness 36.40∗ 46.88 608.1
(1.65) (1.54) (0.30)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15229 15229 11079
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 5: Connectedness of banker-directors. We test hypothesis 2 by running the following
regression on equation 1 where the dependent variable, MDRt+1 is the debt level, measured as the ratio
of total debt to the sum of market capitalization and total debt, is regressed on different measures of
connectedness: Degree, Closeness and Betweenness. In the first column, the value for the firm is given by
the value of the most connected banker on the board, where a firm with no banker is given a value of 0.
In the second column, the value of board connectedness is measured as the maximum connectedness of the
individual director (excluding bankers). In the third column, we repeat the latter variable but exclude firms
that have banker-directors. All estimates include the controls used in the previous tables, Board Size as
instrument, and year and firm fixed effects. We also control for year-industry median effects. All variables
are winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EBIT/Assets -0.152*** -0.207*** -0.171*** -0.197*** -0.171***
(-7.35) (-4.69) (-7.40) (-5.37) (-6.92)
log Market-to-Book -0.0924*** -0.0880*** -0.0953*** -0.0910*** -0.0954***
(-16.99) (-9.96) (-18.51) (-13.20) (-17.69)
Depreciation/Assets -0.352** -0.541** -0.522*** -0.603*** -0.432***
(-2.06) (-2.40) (-3.29) (-2.76) (-2.73)
log Assets 0.0341*** 0.0215* 0.0181* 0.0140 0.0295***
(5.54) (1.90) (1.90) (0.97) (5.35)
Tangibles Assets 0.0701* 0.0444 0.0654** 0.0499 0.0703**
(1.77) (0.88) (2.00) (1.11) (2.06)
R&D expenses -0.163 -0.470* -0.320** -0.485* -0.239**
(-1.64) (-1.87) (-2.44) (-1.95) (-2.21)
R&D not declared -0.00102 -0.0369 -0.0292* -0.0332 -0.0255
(-0.08) (-1.36) (-1.65) (-1.40) (-1.61)
St Dev Returns 0.0438** 0.0470 0.0428 0.0346 0.0674*
(1.99) (1.21) (1.50) (0.96) (1.92)
Inf. Asym. 0.0138*** -0.119* -0.0682** -0.0949* -0.0642*
(3.46) (-1.66) (-2.18) (-1.85) (-1.92)
Presence -0.732
(-1.26)
Degree -0.0149**
(-2.40)
Closeness -3.108
(-1.52)
Betweenness -181.7**
(-2.12)
interation 0.441* 0.00768** 2.008** 84.44**
(1.81) (2.56) (2.08) (2.26)
Constant -0.529***
(-4.06)
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12500 11760 11760 11760 11760
t statistics in parentheses
* p¡0.1, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
Table 6: Interaction information opacity proxy and Bankers’ Presence and con-
nectedness.We test hypothesis 3 by running the following regression on equation 2 where the dependent
variable, MDRt+1 is the debt level, measured as the ratio of total debt to the sum of market capitalization
and total debt, is regressed on (EBIT/TA) EBIT over total assets; the log of market-to-book ratio; (De-
preciation/Asssets) the log of total assets as a measure of size; Tangible Assets is the ratio of fixed to total
assets as a measure of asset tangibility; the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets as a proxy for asset
specificity (missing R&D data is set to zero); , and the standard deviation of total returns index as proxy for
firm volatility. Inf. Asym. is a proxy for information asymmetry based on Maskara and Mullineaux (2011).
Degree, Closeness and Betweenness denote the respective connectedness measures of a banker-director on
the Board. All estimates include Board Size as instrument and year fixed effects. We also control for year
and industry median effects. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
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Coefficient Std. Err. 90% Conf. Int.
q10
(1 vs 0) 0.0043846 0.0022729 0.000646 0.0081232
q25
(1 vs 0) 0.0156265 0.0041548 0.0087925 0.0224606
q50
(1 vs 0) .01082 .0045298 0.0033692 0.0182708
q75
(1 vs 0) -0.0043977 0.0069998 -0.0159113 0.0071159
q90
(1 vs 0) -0.0034469 0.0110712 -0.0216574 0.0147636
Table 7: Quantile treatment effects: Effect of the presence of banker-director (1) vs no
banker (0) on debt level of firms.We test hypothesis 4 by running a quantile treatment effects regression
on equation 1 as in Cattaneo (2010). The dependent variable, MDRt+1 is the debt level, measured as the
ratio of total debt to the sum of market capitalization and total debt, is regressed on (EBIT/TA) EBIT
over total assets; the log of market-to-book ratio; (Depreciation/Asssets) the log of total assets as a measure
of size; Tangible Assets is the ratio of fixed to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility; the ratio of
R&D expenditure to total assets as a proxy for asset specificity (missing R&D data is set to zero); , and
the standard deviation of total returns index as proxy for firm volatility. All estimates include Board Size
as instrument and year fixed effects. We also control for year and industry median effects. All variables are
winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
Coefficient Std. Err. 90% Conf. Int.
q15
(1 vs 0) 0.0062865 0.0026585 0.0019135 0.0106594
(2 vs 0) 0.0146297 0.0074593 0.0023603 0.0268991
q25
(1 vs 0) 0.0093877 0.0042583 0.0023833 0.016392
(2 vs 0) 0.016726 0.0060698 0.0067421 0.0267099
q50
(1 vs 0) 0.0045433 0.0047509 -0.0032712 0.0123579
(2 vs 0) 0.0103283 0.0068571 -0.0009506 0.0216073
q75
(1 vs 0) -0.0032754 0.0077939 -0.0160953 0.0095445
(2 vs 0) -0.0047175 0.0092802 -0.0199821 0.0105471
q90
(1 vs 0) 0.0004884 0.0158953 -0.0256571 0.0266339
(2 vs 0) -0.0047172 0.0199636 -0.0375544 0.0281201
Table 8: Quantile multi valued treatment effects: Effect of the connectedness of
banker-director on debt level of firms. Weakly connected banker-director (1) vs no Banker
(0); Highly connected banker-directors (2) vs no Banker (0). We test hypothesis 5 by running a
quantile treatment effects regression on equation 1 as in Cattaneo (2010). The dependent variable, MDRt+1
is the debt level, measured as the ratio of total debt to the sum of market capitalization and total debt,
is regressed on (EBIT/TA) EBIT over total assets; the log of market-to-book ratio; (Depreciation/Asssets)
the log of total assets as a measure of size; Tangible Assets is the ratio of fixed to total assets as a measure
of asset tangibility; the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets as a proxy for asset specificity (missing
R&D data is set to zero); , and the standard deviation of total returns index as proxy for firm volatility.
All estimates include Board Size as instrument and year fixed effects. We also control for year and industry
median effects. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Robust Standard errors.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Example of a network with 3 firms and 8 directors.
Figure 2: Projection of the example network represented in figure 1 onto the space of
Directors.
Figure 3: Going back to the firm dimension: example using degree
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